

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

March 29, 2013

**TO:** S. A. Stokes, Acting Technical Director  
**FROM:** M. T. Sautman and D. L. Burnfield, Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Savannah River Site Weekly Report for Week Ending March 29, 2013

**SRNS Environmental Management (EM) Budget:** With the exception of facility shift workers and a few other isolated groups, most of the SRNS workforce supporting EM activities will begin 32-hour work weeks next week. As a result, many facilities will only be operating Monday through Wednesday. Because of the potential for distractions, SRNS facilities will be in a deliberate operations mode through April 14. SRNS will continue to repack transuranic waste in H-Canyon and prepare for the start of plutonium oxide production in HB-Line. However, many of the upcoming Recommendation 2012-1 milestones will likely encounter delays, especially since the lack of funds has prevented the hiring of field crews to remove combustibles, de-energize electrical equipment, and upgrade the fire detection and alarm system. Other activities that will be impacted are the dissolution of Sodium Reactor Experiment and other fuel in H-Canyon, the inspection of the H-Canyon air tunnel (see 1/6/12 report), the replacement of the K-Area electric fire pump, and resolution of the leak path factor issue in F/H Laboratory (see 10/29/10 and 11/26/10 reports). Maintenance backlogs are expected to increase in all EM SRNS facilities. If a DOE request to transfer funds is approved, work could return to normal. Otherwise, SRNS will start laying up process equipment in May in anticipation of full furloughs and going to minimum staffing levels in facilities.

**Training:** SRR sent hundreds of workers through training recently after identifying that workers were wearing chemical personal protective equipment without completing the required training.

**Waste Solidification Building:** Recent rains resulted in water leakage through cracks in the external west wall. A concrete consultant investigated these cracks and concluded they were typical concrete shrinkage cracks or restrained-shrinkage cracks. Furthermore, the consultant concluded the cracks are non-structural and do not create concerns with structural integrity or safety. His report included recommendations for repairing the cracks to prevent future leakage.

**Defense Waste Processing Facility:** The site rep reviewed alarm suppression and interlock bypass data sheets. The site rep questioned how SRR was managing compensatory measures that may have been identified 7 – 10 years ago

**Tank Farms:** The following occurred at tank farms this week.

- SRR had unsuccessfully attempted to move a submersible mixing pump (SMP) from Tank 5 to Tank 8 for storage. (See 2/15, 3/8, and 3/15/13 weekly reports.) SRR once again attempted to reinstall it, but the SMP could not be lowered any more than on the first attempt. SRR has secured the pump in the riser and is planning to put the pump inside a waste box.
- SRR also began planning for the replacement of Tank 25's failed exhaust ventilation duct.
- SRR declared they were ready to begin bulk oxalic acid cleaning in Tank 12 and will commence the readiness assessment on April 2.
- Approximately 19 inches of liquid was reported in the annulus of Tank 11. SRR personnel installed a portable ventilation system because the duct for the installed ventilation system was submerged. They sampled the liquid and determined that it was consistent with rainwater in-leakage rather than Tank 11 waste. They then installed a submersible pump and are transferring the annulus contents to the primary tank.
- During a Technical Safety Requirement surveillance, Tank Farms personnel found that "Optimal Tolerance" adjustments could not be made on the Tank 48 composite lower flammability limit (CLFL) analyzer transmitter. The "AS FOUND" readings were correct, but they were unable to adjust the instrument. The instrument was replaced the next day.